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Abstract 
In light of Ronald Reagan's recent death, a debate has ensued over the former 
President's legacy. As his attempt at drastic welfare reform has been placed in historical 
context, Reagan has been widely viewed as instrumental in dismantling the vast welfare 
system constructed during Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" programs. However, his 
critics suggest this policymaking was insensitive to the urban poor in this country. Most 
recent scholars now insist that, despite early legislative victories, Reagan's attack on the 
welfare state was grossly exaggerated. His attitude and ideological approach toward 
social welfare policy could accurately be described as frank and fundamentally 
unchanged during his three decades as a political figure, but his political application of 
these principles shifted significantly over the course of his two-term Presidency. 
This research will demonstrate how and why this shift in policy occurred, as well 
as why the shift was politically and socially necessary. By first analyzing the evolution 
of Reagan's welfare rhetoric and ideology, one can better understand the approach he 
used throughout his two terms as President. This institutional experience illustrates how 
the administration's maturing approach to social welfare policy plainly reflects the 
realities of the American political process at the Federal level. Specifically, the system 
forced Reagan's virulent ideology to be tempered and eventually compromised by 
circumstance and pragmatism. As a result, Reagan's "revolution" of social welfare 
programs did not actually occur. Congressional attitudes and the advice of his appointed 
staff perpetuated a departure from ideological grounds, forcing Reagan to rethink the 
practicality of such rigid doctrine. 
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Although Ronald Reagan's attitude and ideological approach toward social 
welfare policy could accurately be described as frank and fundamentally unchanged 
during his three decades as a political figure, his political application of these principles 
shifted significantly over the course of his two-term Presidency. Importing this ideology 
into the policymaking of his first term, this approach aimed at significantly limiting the 
welfare state and was met with almost unanimous initial approval in Washington. Aided 
by the circumstances of the early eighties, Reagan enacted and passed legislative 
measures that aimed at significantly altering the welfare state he inherited from his White 
House predecessors. Before the byproducts of recession (unemployment, inflation, 
stagnant wages, etc.) materialized in 1982, Reagan wielded his executive influence with 
unprecedented ease. Reminding Americans of the economic ills and policy mistakes of 
the 1970s, Reagan asserted that a "revolution" must occur. "In this present crisis, 
government is not the solution to our problem," Reagan argued, "Government is the 
problem."} This claim contrasted sharply with notions of Lyndon Johnson's "Great 
Society," as well as the legacy of the New Deal. For social welfare, this proposed change 
meant that the federal government could no longer exercise such comprehensive power in 
protecting the interests of America's poor. According to Reagan, Johnson's "War on 
Poverty" was over, and so was the belief that " ... society [had] become too complex to be 
managed by self-rule.,,2 Loosening the chains of the federal government and its liberal 
tax burdens, Reagan ventured to create an unfettered economic and social structure that 
would rely on an old-fashioned American ethos. 
I Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan Talks to America, ed. Richard Mellon (Old Greenwich, Conn.: Devin 
Adair, 1983), 194. ["The Inaugural Address," delivered January 20, 1981] 
2 Ibid. 
1 
To supporters and recipients of social welfare programs, this transfer in policy by 
the Reagan administration suggested that a penetrating. acrimonious ambush was on the 
horizon. Insisting on its wastefulness and the perception that it undermined American 
work ethic and individualism, the welfare state seemed primed for a Reagan dismantling. 
Although the recently elected President assured Americans that " ... no one single group 
[ would be] singled out to pay a higher price," most liberal politicians assumed his attack 
on welfare would disproportionately harm the urban poor.3 Immediately, Reagan set out 
to utilize his newly Republican Senate and a House of Representatives largely 
sympathetic to Reagan's efforts to initiate rapid and broad reform. Any claim that 
Reagan presided over a "revolution", however, should rest heavily on the reforms of this 
first year when he built a supportive coalition of politicians in the 97th Congress of 1981 
and 1982. His staunch ideology and the perceived public mandate of the 1980 election 
would eventually come to a screeching halt late in his first term though. Reagan did little 
to reconcile these circumstances until staff changes and congressional pressure forced a 
shift in policy, as well as a change in his public promises. Reagan's resistance in offering 
up appropriate concessions that inherently opposed his ideology is manifest in the policy-
making of this tumultuous first term. The second term, rife with new staff selections 
within Reagan's inner circle, was plagued by a spli t in the Republican Party between the 
moderates and the hardliners, resulting in a shift of Congressional power. Consequently, 
Reagan's rhetoric and political promises concerning the welfare state became less 
fervent. Understanding that modest advances toward his agenda might still be made, 
Reagan abandoned devoted ideology in favor of more pragmatic politics. 
3 Reagan, Ronald Reagan Talks to America, 195. 
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When most politicians and Washington insiders of the eighties referred to social 
welfare programs, they referred specifically to cash assistance programs that provided 
cash grants to families or individuals who met certain income requirements. During the 
Reagan administration, this assistance came primarily from the federal agency known as 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which afforded cash support to low-
income families with children. This description of "welfare," from a conservative point 
of view, also included the in-kind benefits that could grant services or exemptions which 
allowed the recipients to achieve a standard of living on par with guaranteed American 
rights. These in-kind benefits included programs pertaining to medical care (in this case, 
Medicaid), housing, job training, and vouchers for purchases, such as food stamps. Even 
though programs like Social Security, Medicare, and Unemployment Compensation 
likely belonged under the umbrella of social welfare agencies, an important implied 
distinction between the two sets of programs became apparent during Reagan's two terms 
as President. While the former group of programs distinguished between poor and non-
poor recipients, the latter group did not. This distinction, while clear among most 
politicians, became clearer as the eighties wore on and Reagan's policy propositions 
commonly reflected this key characteristic. 
This research will demonstrate how and why this shift in policy occurred, as well 
as why the shift was politically and socially necessary. By first analyzing the evolution 
of Reagan's welfare rhetoric and ideology, one can understand the approach Reagan 
carried throughout his two terms as President. Reagan's subsequent "attack" on the 
welfare state during his Presidency illustrates how the administration's maturing, and 
politically necessary, approach to social welfare policy plainly reflected the realities of 
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the American political process at the Federal level. Simply put, the checks and balances 
placed upon Reagan during "normal politics" prevented his implementation of radical 
ideas. The system forced Reagan's virulent ideology to be tempered and eventually 
compromised by circumstance and pragmatism. As a result, Reagan's "revolution" of 
social welfare programs did not actually occur. Congressional attitudes and the advice of 
his appointed staff perpetuated a departure from these ideological grounds, which then 
forced Reagan to rethink the practicality of such rigid doctrine. 
Reagan's Ideology and Rhetoric 
The Evolution of Reagan's Approach to Social Welfare (up to 1980) 
Born in 1911, in an Illinois farming community, Reagan spent his twenties 
struggling through the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression. A Protestant work 
ethic was instilled early in his life and since he achieved success by following this model, 
he believed America should provide its citizens with a system that fostered individual 
productivity. Franklin Roosevelt, who Reagan greatly admired throughout his career,4 
presided over the implementation of the largest governmental powers exercised by a 
twentieth century president. Although Reagan supported Roosevelt at the time and 
watched the New Deal President relentlessly attack poverty and inequality, he 
surprisingly carried little of this philosophy into his own political career. 
As his prolific acting career began to wind down after World War II, Reagan 
assumed control of the Screen Actor's Guild (SAG) Presidency, holding the position for 
five years (1947-1952). This marked Reagan's first defacto foray into politics, and the 
budding politician embraced the role wholeheartedly. Fortunately for Reagan's 
4 Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), 152. 
4 
aspirations, his reign as SAG President coincided with the congressional investigations of 
communism in Hollywood. Reagan responded by turning the SAG into a political 
instrument, capable of even challenging the Communist menace.s Beginning in 1954, as 
a corollary to his job as host of the popular "General Electric Theatre," Reagan toured GE 
plants across the nation, praising the company as the very embodiment of American 
enterprise and entrepreneurial spirit.6 Giving hundreds of speeches over the next eight 
years, Reagan began to develop a political persona framed by a new ideological 
foundation. As he became more comfortable with his oratory skills, Reagan shifted from 
company sycophant to America's crusader, warning his audiences of the nation's twin 
dangers: communism abroad and welfare statism at home.7 
In 1964, Reagan would enter the electoral arena for the first time as an advocate 
for Barry Goldwater's presidential campaign. While delivering a paid televised speech 
on Goldwater's behalf, Reagan delivered a now famous speech, dubbed "A Time for a 
Choosing." In the speech he articulated many of the concepts that would be embraced 
and adopted by individualist conservatives of the New Right almost a decade later. 
During the televised dialogue, he condemned big-government politicians like Lyndon 
Johnson, "Who can't see a fat man standing beside a thin one without automatically 
coming to the conclusion the fat man got that way by taking advantage of the thin one." 
He went on to even question those in Johnson's camp, but specifically, he went after the 
television personality Howard K. Smith, who had written, "The profit motive is 
5 Garry Wills, Reagan's America: Innocents at Home (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1987),248-249. 
6 Michael Weiler, ed., Reagan and Public Discourse in America (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 
1992),230. 
7 Anne Edwards, Early Reagan (New York: Morrow, 1987),453-57. 
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outmoded. It must be replaced by the incentives of the welfare state."g To Reagan, the 
federal government's carte blanche in implementing expansive federal programs had 
been driven wildly out of control. Unfortunately, the American public did not yet concur 
with Reagan's contention and Johnson won the election handily. Nevertheless, the 
televised speech marked Reagan's first public, targeted attack on the welfare state. He 
even specifically mentioned the inefficiency of the Aid to Dependent Children Program 
(the precursor to AFDC), citing this story that a Los Angeles judge had relayed to him: 
A fairly young woman with six children, pregnant with her seventh, came to him 
[the judge] for a divorce. Under his questioning it became apparent her husband 
did not share this desire. Then the whole story came out. Her husband was a 
laborer earning $250 a month. By divorcing him she could get an $80 raise. She 
was eligible for $350 a month from the Aid to Dependent Children Program. She 
had been talked into divorce by two friends who had already done this very thing.9 
Appearing eerily similar to the tales of the "Chicago Welfare Queen" he would evoke 
later in his political career, Reagan found the welfare system to be endemic with 
fraudulent abuse and bureaucratic blunders. 
The California gubernatorial races of 1966 and 1970 and his subsequent victories 
in the campaigns, presented Reagan with a suitable, politically prominent platform on 
which he could increase his visibility and polish his ideological rhetoric. Moreover, as a 
Republican Presidential nominee in 1968 and 1976, Reagan continually attacked the 
Johnson-inspired welfare system. Yet, it was his role as Governor of California that 
would establish Reagan as a hardliner on matters of social welfare. Referring to welfare 
as the biggest single outlay of public funds at the federal, state, and local levels of 
government, Reagan sought to fundamentally alter the California's existing plan. 
Unfortunately, Reagan likely faced a concession-laden compromise with the Democrat-
8 Reagan, Ronald Reagan Talks to America, 4. ["A Time for Choosing," delivered October 27,1964] 
9 Ibid., 8-9. 
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controlled California Assembly if he wanted his welfare reform bill to pass. Despite this 
considerable infighting, the California legislature enacted a rather drastic welfare reform. 
The resulting law, and the process which the attempted reform brought about, were 
widely regarded as successes.1O In wake of the bill's passage in 1971, Reagan brashly 
suggested, "We have demonstrated in California that a responsible approach to reform of 
the present welfare system is possible and that given tools, discretion, and adequate 
financial assistance states and counties are in the best position to provide a welfare 
system."U His experiences in proposing and enacting this bill would have a 
conspicuously permanent impact on Reagan's ideological commitment to a welfare state 
predicated by state and locally run administrators. 
Both of the aforementioned Presidential campaigns reflected what he had become 
as well. Combining a denunciation of the withering conservative attack on welfare with 
allegations of the increasing inefficiency in the programs themselves, Reagan's assault 
gained considerable authority. The commonly held perception that the "War on Poverty" 
failed also constituted a method through which Reagan could subvert and question the 
Democratic Party's policymaking. His 1976 campaign was somewhat muffled though, 
due to the simple fact that he ran for the nomination against a Republican incumbent. By 
1980, however, the political soil proved much more fertile. Drastic, plummeting 
economic conditions existed, and a politically prone Democrat occupied the Oval Office. 
The attack on welfare he would launch and pronounce during his 1980 campaign was not 
novel,12 but his adroit combination of populist ideals with American mythology and 
10 Edwin C. Meese III. With Reagan: The Inside Story (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1992),36. 
11 Reagan, Reagan Talks to America, 114. ["On Welfare Reform," delivered in 1972] 
12 "Attacks on the welfare state have been a staple of conservative rhetoric since the inception of 
Roosevelt's New Deal," Weiler, Reagan and Public Discourse in America, 230. 
7 
individualist conservativism created a foundation for an effective and influential ideology 
that could be embraced by a new generation of Conservatives. 
Reagan's Presidential Welfare Ideology 
Ronald Reagan's appeal to mainstream America during the eighties was obvious. 
He understood the importance of flattery in public discourse, and he took every 
opportunity to make his constituency feel like integral cogs in the American machine. 
"We have always reached for a new spirit and aimed at a higher goal," Reagan implored 
in the first joint session speech since the March 1981 assassination attempt, "We have 
been courageous and determined, unafraid and bold ... And that is what makes us, as 
Americans, different.,,)3 He made voters feel wise, politically significant, and part of a 
global American movement. His careful discourse was a revealing example of how 
traditional conservative arguments can potently associate with populism and Protestant 
values. This appeal allowed Reagan to playa unique and considerable role in the attack 
on social welfare in his first term. From where did this ideology derive? What provided 
it with economic legitimization, and what provided it with socially acceptable 
justification? It deserves mention, however, that without the economic conditions of the 
1970s, this adroit combination of the following ideologies would likely have found a 
much less responsive audience. 
Populism as a discourse essentially refers to a set of appeals within the framework 
of a single premise: the popular will is the source of any legitimate exercise of power, 
political or otherwise. Consequently, populism can be summoned by any number 
ideologies and political platforms. Reagan's brand of populism could accurately be 
13 Reagan, Reagan Talks to America, 208. ["A Program for Economic Recovery," delivered April 27, 
1981] 
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portrayed as of a "universalist" slant. This angle meant that he could join a populist 
leadership front capable of speaking on behalf of a vaguely defined majority. Drenching 
his populism under the auspices of the "New Right," his message was directed at all 
Americans, minus the liberal elite which had "oppressed" the American public for almost 
two decades. Reagan would serve as the spokesman for a generation of Americans fed 
up with government mismanagement. Yet, implicitly, his discourse contained an element 
of partisanship. By directing public ire toward the governmental bureaucracy, Reagan 
could exacerbate conflicts between the middle-class and the poor. As beneficiary agents 
of the government's lavish spending, "poor people were, at least by implication, as much 
parties to the usurpation of popular (middle-class) power as were their bureaucratic 
overseers.,,14 From Reagan's Inaugural Address we can see this opinion emerging, 
especially when he sardonically cries, "We hear much of special interest groups. Our 
concern must be for a special interest group far too long neglected ... They are this breed 
called Americans.,,15 Obviously, there are two sets of "people" in this political allegory: 
those represented by the special interest groups, and those represented by Reagan. 
Reagan's "people" are the working, middle-class fabric of America, while the special 
interest groups are unjustly cradling the lower classes. 
Another ubiquitous theme in Reagan rhetoric is one employed by almost every 
politician, though Reagan's usage was particularly astute. Michael Weiler, a public 
communications researcher, declared this approach as one underlined by 'American 
mythology.' Claiming that Reagan's version of United States history falls within 
mainstream America's parameters, Weiler maintains that Reagan encouraged Americans 
14 Ronald Lee, "The New Populist Campaign for Economic Democracy: A Rhetorical Explanation," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 61 (1976): 274-89. 
15 Reagan, Ronald Reagan Talks to America, 194. ["The Inaugural Address, delivered January 20, 1981] 
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to construct their past as a "dual record of economic individualism and social 
volunteerism.,,16 This approach might be unoriginal, but his charismatic nature and 
proficiency at public speaking made its presentation especially convincing. The 
economic individualism he refers to runs parallel to the rhetorical weight carried by 
concepts of entrepreneurialism. In a 1983 Radio Address, Reagan claimed that 
"entrepreneurs have always been leaders in America," while reminding his listeners how, 
"Their knowledge and contributions have sustained us in wartime, brought us out of 
recessions, carried our astronauts to the Moon, and led American industry to new 
frontiers of high technology." 17 In Reagan's view of history, this entrepreneurial courage 
upheld American economic and technological progress. However, Reagan insisted 
Americans were not merely profit seekers. They concerned themselves with the well-
being of their neighbors too, and in a 1981 speech, Reagan addressed a business alliance 
by saying, "Over our history, Americans have always extended their hands in gestures of 
assistance ... They took for granted neighbor would care for neighbor.,,18 Voluntary, 
nongovernmental agencies were best suited for poor relief, and furthermore, it allowed 
Americans to respond to their own inner call to service. 
The public sentiment held by many Americans in the eighties meshed nicely with 
the images of social welfare conveyed by the Reagan administration. Using individualist 
conservatism as his ultimate guide, Reagan personified this approach by describing 
average Americans as possessing "the rugged indi vidualism of the self-sufficient 
16 Weiler, Reagan and Public Discourse in America, 237. 
17 Fred L. Israel, ed., Ronald Reagan's Weekly Radio Addresses: The President Speaks to America 
(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1987), 103. 
18 Ronald Reagan: 1981, Public Papers o/the Presidents o/the United States (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1982),883. 
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pioneer." 19 On broad economic issues, it required that individual citizens remain true to 
some inherent and natural tendencies. These tendencies included a self-centered 
approach to personal decision-making, an economically competitive personality, and a 
trust in the free market structure. This kind of society is only possible if several 
conditions are first met. Namely, it asks for the existence of a truly free market that 
permits voluntary exchanges among mutually benefiting individuals. The economic 
system must also mitigate the prevalence of any coercion upon the individual, but 
particularly the system needs to limit government interference and subjugation.2o This 
relies on the notion that individuals are ultimately responsible for their own social 
condition. By regulating business or unequivocally aiding certain social groups, the 
government can only harm those it is trying to assist. Therefore, the welfare system 
merely perpetuates the poverty stricken world it hopes to eliminate. As a rather practical 
concession, most individualist-conservatives would allow for some government influence 
in social programs, but only to augment the existing philanthropic efforts of private 
charities and churches. As Reagan insisted in 1981, ''The private sector still offers 
creative, less expensive, and more efficient alternatives to solving our social problems.,,21 
This persistence on privatizing poor relief would remain a constant counterpoint and 
refrain in response to claims Reagan was discriminating against those urban poor 
adversely affected by his possible budget cuts. 
To build the coalition of Washington support necessary to launch a Reagan-like 
attack on welfare, the President would have to discover ways to characterize social 
19 Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, ed., Poverty and Social Welfare in the United States (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1988),223. 
20 Kenneth M. Dolbeare, American Ideologies: The Competing Political Beliefs afthe 1970s (Chicago: 
Rand McNally, 1976),58. 
21 Ronald Reagan: 1981, Public Papers of the Presidents afthe United States, 882. 
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welfare and its recipients in such a way that his critics could not decry the uncharitable 
nature of many of the reforms. Much of the welfare terminology enlisted by Reagan was 
developed during his time as Governor of California, fighting that state's welfare system. 
Phrases like welfare mess, culture a/poverty, truly needy, workfare, welfare dependency, 
and welfare bureaucracy, all became commonplace in Reagan's speeches. This cautious 
approach to semantics allowed Reagan to sell the huge welfare budget cuts to the 
American public and to his Congressional counterparts. In a 1976 stump speech for the 
Presidential nomination, Reagan introduced America to what California already "knew" 
existed. "A few years ago in California, we were faced with the kind of "welfare mess" 
we are still faced with in Washington," Reagan argued, "For four years we tried to halt 
the runaway increase in caseload and cost but nothing seemed to work:,22 The welfare 
state was wasteful and inefficient according to leading conservatives, and Reagan 
believed he knew just the steps necessary to solve poverty without expanding this 
"mess." 
In order to imply that certain welfare recipients did not deserve or even require 
federal assistance, Reagan needed to insist that there were different categories of 
recipients. One group abused the "welfare bureaucracy," while the other constituted the 
"truly needy." This restrictive definition of those who should receive cash and in-kind 
benefits was best articulated in another Reagan radio address in February 1983. "[We 
are] far from trying to destroy what is best in our system of humane, free government, 
we're doing everything we can to save it by ... pruning non-essential programs," he 
reasoned, "This way enough resources will be left to meet the requirements of the truly 
22 Ronald Reagan, Reagan, in His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan That Reveal His 
Revolutionary Vision for America, eds. Kiron Skinner, Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson (New 
York: Free Press, 2001), 458. ["Stump Speech Insert," delivered May 12, 1976] 
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needy, and we will meet the challenge of faimess.,,23 In keeping with this notion of the 
"truly needy," the Reagan administration disputed the accepted definition of poverty 
popular with his more liberal contemporaries. Reagan's staff would allege that if in-kind 
benefits (in addition to plain cash aid) were accurately calculated into poverty designation 
equations, the resulting definition of poverty would be much more accurate and 
applicable. Essentially, the new designation would result in a reduction in the numbers of 
Americans living in actual poverty.24 Reagan's reluctance to abandon the "truly needy" 
might be seen as a product of his New Deal fascination and admiration, but more likely, it 
was the result of political posturing. 
Reagan also placed a strong emphasis on cultural factors as a central cause of 
poverty. Conscientiously dubbed the "culture of poverty," Reagan felt the poor exhibited 
values contrary to middle-class ethics regarding family and work behavior. This 
perception included the contention that the poor placed a low value on the institutions of 
marriage and family. Moreover, the poor were unable to delay gratification, reluctant to 
hold high aspirations, and tended to be inclined toward fatalism?5 With these traits 
featured prominently in their decision-making, the poor could not escape their poverty; a 
condition only perpetuated by their own deviant values. This "culture of poverty" not 
only continually hurts the lower-classes, but Reagan would argue it undermines his 
economic and social platform. Reagan hoped to "promote family stability by imposing a 
norm that a man living with a mother and her children had an obligation to support [the 
23 Tomaskovic-Devey, ed., Poverty and Social Welfare in the United States, 225-226. 
24 A holdover argument from his pre-Presidential days when Reagan would cite how the CBO's declared 
poverty used only cash income to determine eligibility, not factoring in the growing levels of non-cash, or 
in-kind, benefits that proliferated the landscape. Reagan, Reagan, In His Own Hand, 392. ["Poverty," 
delivered January 19, 1977] 
25Tomaskovic-Devey, ed., Poverty and Social Welfare in the United States, 226. 
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family]," and made it clear that welfare undermines this stable family system by 
encouraging females to have more children and displace the father figure in order to 
receive federal aid.26 In slight contradiction, Reagan would also discredit and abandon 
the liberal insistence on "workfare," or specifically, the notion that recipients must 
provide proof of current employment in order to obtain continued federal support. In 
1981, broad change to AFDC was enacted that reflected this modification (though the 
changes were later scaled back). For example, after the first four months of employment, 
all the net earnings of an AFDC receiver would be deducted from the benefit package 
(prior to '81,67% was seized).27 To reconcile this tacit hypocrisy, the administration 
could only insist that they were simply assuring that the work ethic norm mentioned 
previously was imposed. 
Lastly, Reagan would find it necessary to advertise the welfare state as a promoter 
of "welfare dependency," a fact predicated only by the inefficiency and fiscal 
irresponsibility of the leviathan "welfare bureaucracy." As late as 1986, Reagan 
continued to integrate "welfare dependency" into his rhetoric, including that year's State 
of the Union Address. "In the welfare culture, the breakdown of the family, the most 
basic support system, has reached crisis proportions ... in female and child poverty, child 
abandonment, horrible crimes and deteriorating schools," Reagan said. The attack on 
welfare had already been countered by compromising Congressional leaders and 
moderates within his staff, but he continued the ideological war. He would wonder 
during the speech how, "After hundreds of billions of dollars in poverty programs, the 
26 Nathan Glazer, "The Social Policy of the Reagan Administration: A Review," Public Interest 75 (1984): 
87. 
27 Ibid., 90. 
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plight of the poor grows more painful.,,28 The result of the welfare state had been, 
Reagan would contend, a cycle of dependency on public handouts. The welfare system 
mitigates and competes with the low-wage earnings of the male head of household, often 
resulting in broken homes. 
Nevertheless, Reagan was most distraught by the prevalence of welfare fraud, 
which had only become possible because of the "welfare bureaucracy's" inadequacies. 
The expansion of the welfare system over the last decade had led to a swift escalation in 
the sheer number of agencies and government employees assigned to administer this task. 
It is not shocking to a conservati ve to discover that welfare fraud occurs, for they feel that 
this bureaucratic structure fosters and encourages dishonesty on the part of poor.29 Many 
of Reagan's favorite, most poignant anecdotes were akin to this perception. After 
meeting a lawyer during his days as California's governor, Reagan proudly narrated her 
tale as a prosecutor in the National Welfare Fraud Association. He would tell his 
audience, "In just two years she has filed charges against 350 suspected welfare cheaters 
and has a near perfect record of convictions." He would even paraphrase the lawyer's 
own words, stating, "She says, 'the cheating is so blatant I could hardly believe it.' And 
she described the cheaters as 'leeches who drink up the resources of those who need 
welfare assistance. ",30 The famous Chicago welfare queen, who used "80 names, 30 
addresses, and 15 telephone numbers" to collect "her tax free cash income [of] $150,000 
a year," eventually would became his most oft-cited welfare fraud story throughout his 
presidential campaigns though (despite claims that she was a mere figment of Reagan's 
28 Both quotes taken from his February 8, 1986 "State of the Union Address," transcribed on the website 
http://wikisource.orglwikifRonald_Reagan's_Fifth_State_oCthe_Union_Speech. 
29 Mark Green and Gail McCoy, ed., There He Goes Again: Ronald Reagan's Reign of Error (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1983),85. 
30 Reagan, Reagan, in His Own Hand, 39l. ["Welfare," delivered on December 22, 1976] 
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imagination). 31 To stop this "unconscionable administrative overhead," Reagan hoped 
the federal government would defer to private charities, which would be less likely to 
succumb to fraudulent efforts.32 
Reagan's liberal opponents took exception to several of these ideological and 
statistical "certainties," regarding the welfare state as not quite the budgetary disaster the 
conservatives suggested it was. First, they argued that some social programs had met 
their objectives. Namely, diminished poverty amongst the aged probably "constituted the 
crowing achievement of modern social policy.,,33 Reagan's critics also took measures 
against the belief that waste and fraud existed within these social programs. Seeing it as 
a non-issue, they made the case that transfer-payment programs common in the welfare 
state typically involved the disbursement of checks, and actually have low overhead costs 
and small bureaucracies. Lastly, it seemed to some that Reagan was turning his back on 
the underclass, even advocating rollbacks which would disproportionately hurt African-
Americans.34 
Reagan & Actual Welfare Reform 
The First Term: From Coalition to Reluctant Retreat 
As illustrated by the previous section, Reagan fostered a virulent, yet appealing, 
approach to welfare reform and the scaling back of its budgetary predominance. How 
severely could Reagan realistically cut back the welfare system? After his landslide 
victory over incumbent President Jimmy Carter, Reagan remained optimistic. His own 
31 Reagan, Reagan, in His Own Hand, 459. ["Stump Speech Insert," delivered January 22, 1976] 
32 Reagan, Reagan, in His Own Hand, 393. ["Poverty," delivered January 19, 1977] 
33 John Karaagac, Between Promise and Policy: Ronald Reagan and Conservative Reformism (Lanham, 
MD: Lexington Books, 2000), 133. 
34 Ibid., 134. 
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Republican Party controlled the Senate, and defenders of the welfare state in Washington 
were on the run. Oftentimes, policy change in the United States is incremental, but 
Reagan sought to oversee a policy shift that would indeed break with the past.35 This 
significant transfer in policymaking needed the support of those newly elected 
Congressman, but it would also require conversion of the continuing members. 
To effectively propose legislation, Reagan needed to place his Office of 
Management and Budget on a new level of prominence. Cognizant of the promises made 
during his election campaign, Reagan understood that his economic program would be 
crucial in helping Americans believe in his ideological and political theories. Seeking to 
emphasize OMB's predetermined importance, its recently appointed leader, David 
Stockman, was made an official member of Regan's cabinet. Though Stockman would 
later write a scathing critique of the Reagan administration in 1986, most insiders 
reluctantly suggested that he headed "The most talented team to ever head the budget 
office," and as Reagan's chief domestic policy advisor, Martin Anderson, said, "They 
[Stockman's team] provided a level of leadership and policy guidance that was unrivaled 
in OMB's history.,,36 Combined with input from domestic advisors like Anderson, Jim 
Baker, and Richard Darman, OMB would preside over and craft the budgetary cuts 
prominently featured in Reagan's flagship 1981 economic program, the Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act COBRA). 
Despite Democratic control of the House of Representatives, Congress was 
overwhelmed by the consequences of Reagan's landslide election, during which a pro-
change policy mandate surfaced. During the Carter Presidency, conservatives, in spite of 
35 Barbara Sinclair, "Agenda Control and Policy Success: Ronald Reagan and the 97th House," Legislative 
Studies Quarterly 10, No.3 (Aug. 1985): 291. 
36 Martin Anderson, Revolution (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988),248. 
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their numerical inferiority at the time, had already begun to "dominate political debate on 
economic policy," and naturally, Reagan's ascendancy emboldened them and was viewed 
as a "ringing endorsement of conservative economic views.,,37 Distrust in the 
government's ability to direct suitable aid programs grew, and in a 1980 election poll, it 
was revealed that 73% of Americans distrusted the federal government, compared to only 
22% as recently as 1964.38 Subsequently, Democrats in Congress recognized that a shift 
within their party's doctrine might serve their best interests. According to Tip O'Neill, 
the Democratic majority leader in the House, "The Democrats were demoralized, 
discredited, and broke.,,39 Fellow Democratic Representative, Carl Perkins (Ky.), was 
reported in the New York Times as worrying, "I've worked for years for the welfare of the 
people, and now I'm seeing practically everything dismantled.,,4o The House Democrats' 
lack of alternative proposals to Reagan's policy indicates just how far Reagan dominated 
this economic debate. Since the public had already linked inflation with federally-funded 
social spending, Democrats hesitantly facilitated the enacting of legislation remarkably 
similar to Reagan's plan. Even O'Neill, who claimed he was not a member of this 
tentative coalition, understood "that if the Democrats were perceived as stalling in the 
midst of a national economic crisis, there would be hell to pay in the midterm 
elections.,,41 The economic hardliners who wholly embraced elements of Reagan's 
individualist conservativism (Anderson, Stockman, and Reagan's longtime confidant, 
Edwin Meese III, among others) served at the vanguard for these cuts. 
37 Sinclair, "Agenda Control and Policy Success: Ronald Reagan and the 1971h House," 293. 
38 Seymour Lipset, The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 17. 
39 Thomas P. O'Neill, Man of the House (London Bodley Head, 1987),338. 
40 New York Times, May 20, 1981, pp. 22. 
41 O'Neill, Man of the House, pp. 344. 
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Tax cuts in OBRA reduced rates for everyone, but skewed more heavily toward 
the higher-income taxpayers who would provide the capital necessary for "trickle down" 
results. By 1984, the net effect of the social program cuts produced modest increases for 
the broad middle-class, substantial gains for higher-income families, while those with 
incomes less than $15,000 who had received benefit packages (AFDC, food stamps, etc.) 
were "likely to find themselves worse off."42 Governmental spending cuts had been 
promised by Reagan, but were made largely in response to "short-term economic 
exigencies and ... motivated more by a desire to save money wherever the political 
resistance was weakest than by an integrated vision for welfare reform.,,43 The direct 
impact on the urban poor was significant. Of the $250 billion made in cuts, close to 70% 
of the savings, came from programs openly affecting the poor. According to those same 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reports, "of the 450,000 to 500,000 families with 
earnings estimated to be receiving AFDC at the time of the [1981 OBRA] changes, about 
one-half are estimated to have lost their eligibility.,,44 The administration also cut back 
the food stamp and work incentive programs. This round of cuts seemed to symbolically 
mark the point at which "Great Society" spending ceased. As Deputy Chief of Staff 
Richard Darman said, OBRA constituted "the largest single spending control bill and the 
largest single tax reduction bill in the history of the American republic.,,45 Reagan had 
successfully exercised his considerable Presidential influence to exact the changes his 
42 John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill, ed., The Reagan Experiment: An Examination of Economic and 
Social Policies under the Reagan Administration (Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute Press. 1982),21. 
43 W. Elliot Brownlee. ed., The Reagan Presidency: Pragmatic Conservatism and Its Legacies (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas. 2003). 211-212. 
44 Robert Benenson, America's Needy: Care and Cutbacks (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly 
Inc., 1984),4. 
45 Richard Darman, Who's in Control? Polar Politics and the Sensible Center (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1996),70. 
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ideological counterparts, like Stockman and Anderson, regarded as necessary precursors 
to "revolution." 
However, early hints at internal strife and growing Congressional influence 
became apparent at the end of this first year. Reagan's administration had dominated the 
economic agendas and discourse in Congress during the better part of 1981, forcing 
"even mainstream Democrats ... to support the administration's specific proposals.,,46 
Yet a return to "normal politics," which had festered under the shadow of the 1980 
Election, cautiously emerged after these initial successes. With midterm elections 
looming in 1982, some members in Congress found their constituency increasingly 
concerned over the deepening recession as they became generally opposed to further 
spending cuts. In late September 1981, Reagan called for additional cuts in fiscal 1982 
social spending and those Congressmen up for reelection found it difficult to support 
such a measure.47 Thus, Reagan began to fight against his opponents' counter-proposals, 
and even when the administration was on the offensive again, it was not always 
advocating its preferred policy. Unfortunately, Reagan felt that the perceived mandate 
would carryon longer into the end of his first term, and farther into the social program 
restructuring he desired. This proved to be a slightly overconfident feeling, and this 
approach became politically unwise. Reagan's more moderate advisors, Jim Baker and 
Richard Dorman particularly, began to assert more control and dictate policy decisions, 
all while Democrats in Congress began to launch effective counterattacks when Reagan's 
ideological crusade went too far. Even moderate Republicans began to question the 
longevity of OBRA policies, foreshadowing the split which would occur in Reagan's 
46 Sinclair. "Agenda Control and policy Success: Ronald Reagan and 97 tlt House," 312. 
47 Ibid .• 301. 
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second term. Democrats first discovered their soon-to-be-adopted argument regarding 
Reagan's social welfare cuts during the uproar over the USDA's decision to issue new 
school lunch regulations in the face of OBRA's severe cuts. Declared an issue of 
"fairness," Democrats attempted to weather this first storm of budgetary assaults by 
retaliating against this vulnerable target; one that amazingly tried to permit schools to 
count ketchup as a vegetable. 
While Democrats found ways to unite, the increasing deficit, a result of massive 
buildup and irresponsible tax cuts, assured that many Republicans would become 
reluctant to accept Reagan's constant attack on social programs and the poor. Republican 
Representatives who had helped deftly steer OBRA through the Congressional process, 
lamented the antipoverty impacts of the Reagan administration policies. Moderates like 
Bob Dole (KS) and Pete Domenici (NM) increasingly realized tax hikes might be the 
only cure, while even staunch Conservatives like Trent Lott (MS) and Dick Cheney 
(WY) became "paranoid on the subject of further spending cutS.,,48 This period from the 
fall of 1981 through the spring of 1982 set the stage for a midterm election in which 
Republicans lost 26 House seats and came within 50,000 votes of losing five seats in the 
Senate and control of that chamber. Reagan's attempt to force down the size of the 
domestic welfare state, until it could be adequately funded with the revenues available 
after the tax cut, appeared trite in the face of Dole's moral argument on the House floor 
that "Somebody else is going to have to start taking a hit besides welfare recipients.,,49 
48 Christopher Howard, The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and Social Policy in the United States 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997),146. Benneson, America's Needy: Care and Cutbacks, 215. 
49 David A. Stockman. The Triumph of Politics: How the Reagan Revolution Failed (New York: Harper & 
Row. 1986), 304-305. 
21 
Suddenly, with the economic realities of recession coming to the fore in late 1982, 
Reagan's budget cuts did not seem quite as inevitable and necessary. 
Meanwhile, a rift was forming within Reagan's inner circle over the President's 
proposal to amend the Social Security system in 1981. Intoxicated with the legislative 
successes of that year, Reagan foolishly embarked on outlining a reform measure that 
could alienate the wealthier segment of his constituency. Under Stockman's advice, 
Reagan planned to cut federal spending on Social Security. His campaign pledges, 
however, had promised to avoid slashing funds allotted to the "truly needy," which 
included senior citizens receiving Social Security benefits. Furthermore, Social Security 
was guaranteed to all citizens, not just low-income families who qualified for aid, so this 
proposal negatively affected middle-class and upper-class families as well. Against the 
judgment of his White House troika (Baker, Meese, and Deaver), Reagan's plan would 
cause him to renege on promises he made in the 1980 campaign. 
After Reagan realized the realities of his proposed policy, he backed off, but the 
incident foretold of a future split within his staff. Meese and Anderson were able to 
compromise with the moderates this time, but Baker and Darman, like a number of other 
Republicans in the Capital, had "come to realize that the depth and breadth of the tax cut 
was a mistake."so On the other hand, Stockman stil1 thought preening Social Security 
could be possible. To the OMB chair, Social Security was a form of "closet socialism."Sl 
Stockman, an advocate of drastic economic changes at the federal level, believed Reagan 
could lead a "supply-side" revolution which would remove the federal government from 
America's free enterprise system. Namely, Stockman felt all government programs, 
50 Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime, 209. 
51 Stockman, The Triumph of Politics, 182. 
22 
especially social agencies, should gradually be reduced and left under the auspices of the 
American market. Baker and Darman, meanWhile, were much less responsi ve to such 
radical change, hoping that Reagan would simply cut back where spending was the most 
inefficient. A rift naturally developed between Baker and Stockman over Social Security 
until Stockman's falling out over his expose of the Reagan administration in an issue of 
Atlantic Monthly. In the article, Stockman famously referred to supply-side economics as 
a "Trojan horse" used to cut taxes on the wealthy.52 Baker immediately called for 
Stockman's departure, but Reagan allowed Stockman to stay on while he was slowly 
phased out of his influential position. 
The tentative coalitions formed during the euphoria of Reagan's landslide victory 
slowly deteriorated as pragmatism replaced ideological application. The first sign of a 
decisive shift came in the fall of 1982, when Reagan openly supported a $98.2 billion 
dollar tax hike. Remarkably, this was just the kind of economic proposal Reagan had 
pledged to eliminate during his 1980 campaign. Urged on by the fact that defense 
spending was rising and that the 1982-1983 recession was deeper than Reagan had 
previously thought, the President felt the hike was necessary and practical. These terms 
successfully undercut his ideological vision, but Reagan astutely avoided a budgetary 
crisis by embracing the new tax policy. Presidential advisor Edwin Meese later called 
this compromise "the Debacle of 1982," and regarded it as, "the greatest domestic error 
of the Reagan administration," but those words might be tinged with resentment since 
Meese's influence decline rapidly during this period.53 For Democrats, it was a huge 
political coup. Reagan's support for the tax hike allowed them to freely associate 
52 Stockman, The Triumph of Politics, Introduction. 
53 Meese III, With Reagan, 147. 
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Republicans with tax raises and with failing to keep campaign promises. However, 
Baker and Darman understood that tax hikes were necessary to squelch the byproducts of 
recession and to fund government spending in other spheres. Reagan's conciliatory 
approach during this event foreshadowed the practical policymaking which permeated 
throughout the second term. 
Despite Reagan's evolving legislative approach to welfare and federal spending, 
the first term still included some foolish political mistakes. The passage of the 
aforementioned tax bill had coincided with the emergence of a precarious political issue: 
hunger. Serving as a manifestation of the recession-caused hardship and insecurity 
facing urban America, hunger represented a new political battleground. With stories of 
extreme unemployment and food shortages in cities like Detroit and Newark, emergency 
food aid became a national emergency as congressional subcommittees launched high-
profile investigations into the issue.54 Strangely enough, when faced with public scrutiny 
and intolerance, the Reagan administration was occasionally too bold. Reagan insisted 
that federal food and nutrition programs had not been reduced and that food stamps were 
available. To Reagan, it seemed only mismanagement and fraud should be blamed. Less 
prudent than the President, Edwin Meese shamelessly insisted that he did not "know of 
any authoritative figures that [indicates] there are hungry children," while duly noting 
that "people go to soup kitchens because the food is free and that's easier than paying for 
it.,,55 Democrats, led by Tip O'Neill, launched an effective assault against these 
insensitive remarks, readying itself for the next year's election. These politically tactless 
remarks left Meese weakened and insignificant as an advisor and at the end of the year, 
54 Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the Waron Poverty to the War on Welfare (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1989), 126. 
55 New York Times, December 15, 1983, B 13. 
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Meese had left the White house for the Department of Justice. Combined with the 1982 
departure of Reagan's old friend, Martin Anderson,56 the hardliner's descent was almost 
complete. The White House political director from 1981 to1985, Ed Rollins observed 
that, "Every single day Ed Meese was in that White House he lost power or gave up 
power," while, "Every single day Jim Baker was in that White House he accumulated 
power - or Dick Darman accumulated power.,,57 Legislative efforts to alter social welfare 
programs would illustrate this shift in his next term. 
The Second Term: Compromise and Reduction 
An elevation of cautious, short-term politics over his own revolutionary ideology 
had become a discernible theme of Reagan's first term as it came to a close. He even 
adopted this strategy as a platform for his re-election campaign in 1984. Though Richard 
Darman later complained that Reagan's campaign strategy "managed to bypass 
conventional substance altogether," Reagan understood the mandate of 1980 was no 
longer attainable.58 Aided by a slight economic recovery in 1983, Reagan garnered 59 
percent of the vote and won forty-nine of the fifty states. Reagan responded by issuing a 
broad reorganization of his cabinet, as Chief of Staff James Baker swapped jobs with 
Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, Edwin Meese reentered the administration by 
becoming Attorney General, and Deputy Chief of Staff Mike Deaver resigned. Reagan's 
"troika" which helped him govern in his first term was gone. Two policy initiatives in his 
second term, the 1986 Tax Reform Act and the Family Support Act of 1988, clearly 
56 As a contrast to Meese's departure, Anderson claims he left voluntarily. "I never did enjoy government 
work," and "I was convinced that 80 to 90 of all policy changes are made during the first year of a new 
administration." Anderson, Revolution, 211. 
57 Cannon, President Reagan: Role of a Lifetime, 152. 
58 Darman, Who's in Control?, 141. 
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reveal this transition in Reagan's public stance on social welfare and the poor. The 
President deferred more often to his advisors than he had even in the first term, where 
Stockman had dominated the administration's economic discourse. Reagan had always 
relied on and trusted the advice of those he appointed. Even his closest supporters who 
felt betrayed by the new direction admitted this fact. Edwin Meese would report in his 
memoir, "Ronald Reagan believed in cabinet government, using this forum as his primary 
means of obtaining policy advice and information."s9 Reagan's White House spokesman 
Larry Speakes confirms this, "At Cabinet and staff meetings the President was usually a 
listener. He would walk in and say, 'All right, tell me what you think.',,6o However, 
when this leadership style was combined with the recent staff shakeups, Reagan's advice 
now came almost exclusively from his less dogmatic, more politically sensible aides. 
Domestic and economic concerns had been largely absent from much of Reagan's 
agenda in 1984 and 1985, as international concerns dominated his Presidential 
responsibilities in these two years. High-ranking CIA agent William Buckley was 
kidnapped by terrorists in Lebanon, America became involved in the Nicaraguan crisis, a 
TWA Flight 847 from Athens was hijacked by terrorists, and Reagan initiated a new 
round oftalks with Mikhail Gorbachev. This international involvement consigned 
welfare reform to the margins of the Oval Office's dialogue, but when Reagan 
readdressed the plight of the poor and the welfare state's deficiencies in his 1986 State of 
the Union Address,61 debate over federal funding of social programs reemerged. 
Remembering the Democrat's "fairness" critique, Reagan's staff hoped their proposed 
59 Meese III, With Reagan, 34. 
60 Larry Speakes, Speaking Out: The Reagan Presidency from Inside the White House (New York: 
Scribner, 1988),304. 
61 See Footnote 28. 
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1986 tax reform would "erase the cartoon of our party as defender of the rich and 
privileged.,,62 Put together by Jim Baker and Richard Darman, the bill, among other 
things, removed six million low-income workers from income tax liability.63 Further 
illustrating the ascendancy of the pragmatic politicians in his staff, the bill expanded the 
controversial EITC program. Essentially a wage subsidy for the working poor, the 
Earned Income Tax Credit system was vehemently opposed by uncompromising, 
Reaganite conservatives.64 However, with Meese, Anderson, and Stockman relegated to 
the periphery of Washington's political circle, this reform bill should not be viewed as a 
shock. 
By the time Don Regan was replaced as Chief of Staff in 1987, due mostly to the 
fallout of the Iran-Contra affair, Reagan began to understand that a positive political 
legacy might be contingent on the reforms of his final two years. Unfortunately for 
Reagan's legacy, the Iran-Contra affair and the discovery that he had illegally diverted 
funds to support contra guerrillas in Nicaragua destroyed America's trust in the President, 
and as Reagan biographer Lou Cannon claims, "Emotionally, Reagan was at the ebb tide 
of his presidency.,,65 With the President's popularity drastically waning, Senate 
Republicans, especially the Finance Republicans led by Dole, could no longer align 
themselves with radical White House initiatives, especially since Democrats had recently 
regained control of the Senate in 1986. Publicly admitting notions of political 
compromise within the GOP, it became decidedly fashionable for Republicans to 
62 Quote from Reagan's advisor, Mitch Daniels. Howard, Hidden Welfare State, 232. 
63 Although James Baker was no longer Chief of Staff (he was replaced by Don Regan in 1985), he still 
wielded considerable clout in fiscal policy by serving in Reagan's Treasury Department. William 
Pemberton, Exit with Honor: The Life and Presidency o/Ronald Reagan (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 
1997), 145. 
64 Brownlee, ed., The Reagan Presidency: Pragmatic Conservatism and Its Legacies, 217. 
65 Cannon, President Reagan: Role 0/ a Lifetime, 639. 
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acquiesce to some directives which would have been seen as preposterous to conservative 
politicians just a few years prior. Furthermore, the New York Times then reported the 
sharpest one-month decline in presidential approval history,66 merely confirming the 
immense impact late 1986 had on Reagan's political standing. Replacing Regan as Chief 
of Staff was the former Senate Majority leader responsible for guiding several early 
Reagan initiatives through Congress, Howard Baker. A seasoned politician, cognizant of 
the prevalence of Congressional compromise, Baker immediately set out to restore 
positive relations with Congress. Even the great compromiser, Richard Darman, 
described Baker as "chronically moderate," and the freshly appointed Chief of Staff 
wasted no time in finding new allies and rebuilding bridges burnt by Regan's pride and 
incompetence.67 One of these new allies would be the chief architect of the Family 
Support Act of 1988, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY). With the freshly 
established support of some unlikely collaborators, Howard Baker planned to appeal to 
the practical listener inside Reagan. 
This side of the President was not as dormant as his critics might suggest. 
Richard Darman realized by 1983 that "it seemed increasingly clear that, when forced to 
choose, the President was willing to risk alienating his right flank in order to strengthen 
his political viability in the broad American middle. He would sacrifice the purity of his 
ideology for the practical necessities of governance.,,68 Another of his closest associates, 
David Stockman, noticed the same characteristic. "[Reagan] was a consensus politician, 
not an ideologue," Stockman conceded, "He had no business trying to make a revolution 
66 Presidential popularity dropped from 70 percent to 46 percent. Cannon, President Reagan: Role of a 
Lifetime, 639 and 608. 
67 Darman, Who's in Control?, 183. 
68 Ibid., 115. 
28 
because it wasn't in his bones.,,69 Baker merely needed to bring this latent personality 
trait of Reagan's into the political forefront. The Chief of Staff was eventually successful 
and the result was the President's approval of Moynihan's bill. Against the advice of his 
welfare specialists,70 Reagan signed a measure loaded with concessions to the poor, 
including a 10 percent increase in AFDC and welfare expenditure totaling roughly $3.3 
billion dollars (CBO figures). This increase in federal welfare investment virtually undid 
his 1981 reforms, and the approved benefits could even been seen as retroactively 
compensating those who had lost them earlier. Grudgingly admitting ideological defeat 
in his memoir, the loyal Reaganite Martin Anderson confesses, "It is commonly believed 
that federal spending on social welfare programs was slashed during the presidency of 
Ronald Reagan. It is not true. Spending on social welfare programs increased surely and 
steadily.,,71 Reagan's 1980 election seemed a distant memory, as did the initial welfare 
cuts. In place of the 1981 cuts stood a welfare state quite antithetical to his ideological 
background. 
Lessons: Reagan & the Realities of the American Political System 
The federal budget process was the main conduit through which the Reagan 
administration attempted to convert its philosophical beliefs into public policy. This 
process meant that Reagan would force Congress to adhere to a centralized, top-down 
approach to federal budgeting. Led by David Stockman, the intrepid OMB chairman, the 
1981 fiscal year produced Reagan's most successful implementation of this strategy. 
69 Stockman, The Triumph of Politics, 9. 
70 Throughout 1987 and much of 1988, Reagan's welfare team argued that "no bill at all would be 
preferable to Moynihan's cunningly expansive measure." Brownlee, ed., The Reagan Presidency: 
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However, the economic downturn and the return to "normal politics" in late 1982 marked 
a shift toward more practical policymaking. After 1981, Reagan and his advisors had 
much less success in cutting domestic spending and limiting the growth of entitlement 
programs through this process.72 This Reagan budgetary experience with domestic 
spending suggests that any President who attempts similar measures will likely encounter 
a number of barriers. Richard Darman, Jim Baker, and Howard Baker all detected this 
more swiftly than others, and their political careers prospered under these circumstances. 
Criticizing the naivety of some members in Reagan's cabinet, Darman claimed, 
"[Stockman] and many others regretted the limits that the system imposed upon their 
ability to effect change.'.?3 After the residue of 1981 had worn off, Reagan correctly 
allowed the majority of his domestic advice to resonate from these members. Succinctly 
put in his book, The Triumph of Politics (the title alone implies that political pragmatism 
maintains a substantial presence in the governmental process), Stockman shamefacedly 
admits, "The true Reagan Revolution never had a chance. It defied all of the 
overwhelming forces, interests, and impulses of American democracy. Our Madisonian 
government of checks and balances, three branches, two legislative houses, and infinitely 
splintered power is conservative, not radical.',74 Moreover, much of the federal budget is 
composed of entitlement programs that remain entrenched in treacherous political 
territory. Social welfare continues to hold a relatively prominent role in federal spending, 
despite constant attacks and criticism. 
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The landslide election of 1980, in which Republicans won control of the Senate 
and Reagan demolished Carter, insidiously crafted a policymaking illusion. This early 
success allowed Reagan to hold on to his ideological stance longer than it was politically 
realistic, but he soon discovered ideological compromise was a necessary prerequisite to 
real policy change. As Martin Anderson wrote, HA president may be able to influence 
spending up in some areas and down in others, but ultimately he must get congressional 
approval for every nickel.,,75 Almost exclusively, that Congressional approval comes at a 
cost: ideological abandonment. By committing himself to incremental change and 
modest victories, Reagan wisely succumbed to the American system of government. 
Darman confinned that this submission took place, reporting that, "The Reagan 
experience was less a revolution than an affirmation of the power of the American 
political system ... From this perspective, the answer to the who's-in-control question 
came to seem compellingly clear. In some important sense, the system was 'in 
control'.,,76 Yet Reagan should not be viewed as totally subordinate to this reality. He 
dominated political discourse and allowed his party to dictate some policy directives, 
meaning his political legacy could carryon into the following decades. 
75 Anderson, Revolution, 177. 
76 Darman, Who's in Control?, 183 
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